Israel and Hezbollah lurch closer to war

Parallels with Gaza are inevitable and real: Hamas and Hezbollah, viewed as terrorist groups by the U.S., are heavily backed by Iran. Both consider Israel illegitimate and their conflict with it to be holy and existential. And just as Hamas in Gaza was born in the 1980s as a militant movement challenging Israeli occupation, so too was Hezbollah in Lebanon.

But important distinctions mean war with Hezbollah would be even more devastating.

The group is much more important to Iran than Hamas. And as traumatic as the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas was for Israel, Hezbollah is a much more powerful military force.

Through intense focus and preparation over the past 18 years, it has assembled perhaps 100,000 men while amassing 150,000 rockets and missiles, about half of which can reach major Israeli cities, along with a growing arsenal of attack drones.

Israel’s lauded air defense systems — Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow — would be overwhelmed by a Hezbollah assault expected to amount to 3,000 rockets a day for weeks — especially if it were joined by other militias in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Power stations, offshore gas rigs, military bases, airports and thousands of ordinary citizens would be at risk, as illustrated in a video released by Hezbollah last week showing drone footage of key facilities that it would target.

Pressure on the economy would be immense. The chief economist of Israel’s finance ministry estimates GDP growth rate would fall from a current 1.9% to -1.5% because of reserve recruitment and disruptions to infrastructure and education, and that would likely lead to a further credit downgrade for the country.

On the other side of the border, the picture would be even more grim, starting from a much more dire place.

Neighborhoods in southern Lebanese villages, including Aita Al-Shaab, Aytaroun and Khiyam, have been leveled by Israeli air strikes, prompting thousands of people to flee and straining an economy still reeling from a financial meltdown four years ago that saw the country default on its Eurobonds for the first time in its history and the currency collapse.

When the 2006 war ended after 34 days, Arab Gulf countries pledged billions to help Lebanon rebuild infrastructure including airports, ports, telecom towers, power plants and bridges as far as 140 km from the border with Israel.

The Lebanese public isn’t interested in another round of combat, which would bring more death, injury and damage that might never be repaired. It’s a different Middle East today. Saudi Arabia — once a key donor with significant influence in Lebanese politics — has lost interest, leaving Shiite Muslims led by Hezbollah to become the unrivaled power in the country.

“I don’t think any of the potential belligerents actually want to see a war or conflict spread,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said last week, but like Guterres, he noted that a miscalculation or misunderstanding could set one off.

Apart from its diplomats, Biden’s administration is using its supply chain — slowing weapons deliveries to Israel — to try to avoid a broader conflict. It is assuring Israel of help if war erupts while stopping short of promising all out support.

In truth, Israel wouldn’t want to open a second front until its campaign against Hamas in Gaza is over. That could be weeks or months.

Yet Israelis consider Hezbollah’s barrage of rockets and missiles to be acts of pure aggression. So, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would have broad public support for his threats to push Hezbollah away from the border, despite all the risks.

“You have a lot of bluster going on between Hezbollah and the Israeli government at the moment, but that doesn’t mean it couldn’t spill over into something more serious,” Hagar Chemali, founder of Greenwich Media Strategies, a Connecticut-based geopolitical consultancy, told Bloomberg TV on June 21. “This summer is when we’ll see tensions increase significantly.”