Editorial: NATO needs better bridges -- and bulwarks
Published in Op Eds
Although the U.S. and its allies agreed recently to put Ukraine on an “irreversible path” to NATO membership, there’s no avoiding the obvious: A Trump presidency could well render such pledges meaningless.
Former President Donald Trump has threatened to hollow out U.S. support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — even if Congress puts up some legal hurdles to pulling out entirely — while his running mate, Senator JD Vance, has been a prominent opponent of aid to Ukraine.
The alliance’s future, not to mention Ukraine’s, is therefore uncertain. That makes it all the more important that NATO’s European allies move beyond vague pledges and bridge metaphors. They need to act decisively to ensure Ukraine can still defend itself.
Europe seems to be waking up to the challenge. Defense spending among European NATO members and Canada is up by 18% this year, with 23 of 32 members now meeting the group’s requirement of 2% of GDP. (Poland spends more than 4% on defense.) The allies approved €40 billion a year of financial assistance for Ukraine and agreed to offer more training and military support, something the U.S. had been providing successfully but which risks disruption under Trump.
Yet all this is still catch-up work after many years of neglect; a sizable gap remains. Measures taken to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank and boost the number of troops at high readiness were commendable but insufficient to defend the Baltic nations if they came under attack.
Indeed, if Russia wound up its war in Ukraine sometime in 2025, analysts reckon it would take all of two years for Russian President Vladimir Putin to rebuild forces and stockpiles sufficient to pose a serious threat to Europe. NATO’s new commitment merely extends current levels of assistance for Ukraine; it’s less than half the amount that Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg argued for.
The alliance’s most important pledge at its last meeting — to expand defense-industrial capacity — was as vague as its promise to Ukraine. That won’t do. Europe’s unduly fragmented defense industry hampers both its support for Ukraine and its own capabilities. While procurement has long been considered a national responsibility, E.U. states need to look hard at the price of such inefficiency and underinvestment. E.U.-level efforts to procure ammunition show what’s possible when cooperation wins out over narrow national interests.
Allies can also do more to hamper Russia’s own defense-industrial capabilities, which rely heavily on sourcing machine tools, spare parts, software, microelectronics and other essential dual-use supplies from NATO countries as well as Taiwan, South Korea and elsewhere. Shutting down the holding companies and fronts that are funneling these supplies is painstaking but essential work.
Ukraine is belatedly receiving additional ammunition, air defenses and fighter planes, though supplies remain too stretched to match battlefield needs in most cases. Putin’s bet (supported by North Korea, China and Iran) is that a distracted, disengaged and more China-focused U.S. will lack the will or the means to deliver decisive support to Kyiv, ultimately allowing Russia to dictate the terms of a truce. Should his bet pay off, NATO’s own future credibility looks far less certain than its recent celebrations suggest.
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©2024 Bloomberg News. Visit at bloomberg.com. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.
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