Furthermore, as the largest budget contributor to the EU, the Scholz government was instrumental in channeling a staggering 77.2 billion euros (about $83 billion) of financial assistance from Brussels to Ukraine during this period. And through shrewd diplomacy, Scholz first opened the door to EU membership talks with Ukraine and then helped secure additional funding of 50 billion euros ($54 billion) to save Ukraine from economic collapse as the war against Russia drags on.

Yet, Scholz faces criticism for denying Ukraine some weapons systems, including Taurus cruise missiles that could strike deep into Russia.

His argument is that prudence is necessary to avoid escalating the conflict, but Germany’s conservative opposition and parts of his own coalition maintain that Scholz must show greater resolve to deter Russia.

What’s clear is that Germany has come a long way since receiving ridicule for offering Ukraine 5,000 helmets ahead of Russia’s 2022 invasion. And Scholz’s room for maneuver is limited by a German public that remains wary of wielding military power abroad.

More significant than higher defense spending and aid to Ukraine, then, might be changes to the direction of German foreign and security policy. Ironically, the land of revered strategic thinkers such as Carl von Clausewitz had never released a national security strategy prior to the Zeitenwende.

Since then, the Scholz government unveiled Germany’s first national security strategy in June 2023, and a month later its first China strategy. Both documents provide cleareyed assessments of the growing challenges posed by Russia and China – risks that previous governments appeared to ignore.

Germany has already taken steps to implement its new strategy, most notably on Russia. Before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Germany imported 55% of its gas from Russia. By January 2023, it had achieved energy independence from Russia.

Few thought this was economically and politically possible, especially because Scholz’s party had a long-standing “special relationship” with Russia – from former Chancellor Willy Brandt’s “Ostpolitik,” which sought to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, to Gerhard Schröder’s cozying up with Putin.

Reducing dependence on China presents a more formidable challenge for Germany, and it is still too early to assess the impact of the Zeitenwende on this critical relationship.

Notably, the new China strategy sets a more assertive tone: “China has changed. [Hence] we need to change our approach to China.” Berlin now emphasizes derisking its economic relationship with China, whose raw materials, cheap factories and growing middle class had long allowed German carmakers and other export-oriented companies to thrive.

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